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China’s Ethnic Policies Facing Challenges 
 
Developments in Tibet and Xinjiang sin 2008 have again cast the spotlight on China’s ethnic 
policies, highlighting its significance and challenges.  In March 2008 two-week riots broke out in 
Tibetan-inhabited areas in western China.  In the wake of the Chinese crackdown, protests 
against the Beijing Olympic torch relay occurred in London, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Seoul, 
and New Delhi.1   In August the worst attacks by radical Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang since mid the 
1990s took place in Kashgar and Kuqa, killing twenty-nine people.   
 
The aforementioned events signified challenges to Beijing’s ethnic policy.   Many in the West 
usually blame Beijing for frequently violating rights of Tibetans and Uighurs.  To better 
understanding Beijing’s ethnic policy, a proper and balanced perspective is needed.  This article 
gives an overview and assessment of the pillar of Beijing’s policies toward ethnic minorities, i.e., 
regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (RAEM, or民族区域自治).  It also looks at the recent 
development of ethnic issues and ethnic policy in China. 
 
Context and Evolution of China’s Ethnic Policies 
 
There are 55 officially-recognized ethnic minorities in China, accounting for 8.4% of the 
population.  Ten of them each range from two to sixteen million in population, and the remaining 
45 ethnicities each from 1.9 millions to 2,900.  Ethnic minorities concentrate in the twelve western 
provinces, especially the five autonomous provinces.  A number of ethnicities spread through 
provinces. For example, the Hui (Sinicized Muslims) live in 19 provinces.   
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1 “China Ready to Tackle Unrest in Tibetan Regions,” posted at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idUSLAU64099220080316 on March 16, 2008, accessed July 2, 2008. 
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The ethnic issue has broad ramification for China’s national unity and security.  Although 
relatively small in population, ethic minorities inhabit areas 64% of the area of China, most of 
which is on the borders.  In the recent decades separatist and ethnic riots have broken out in 
Xinjiang and Tibetan areas.   
 
To satisfy ethnic aspiration while securing national unity, the CCP practices so- called regional 
autonomy (quyu zizhi 区域自治) in areas where 20 percent or more of population is ethnic 
minorities.  RAEM was inspired by the Soviet ethnic policy, imperial China’s practice toward 
ethnic groups and the CCP’s competition against the Nationalists in winning over ethnic minorities 
in the 1930s and 1940s. It was installed in the 1950s.  It aimed to introduce a balance between 
integration and co-existence of ethnic minorities with the Han.  However, from the late 1950s to 
the late 1970s the RAEM was undermined by Mao’s radicalism and forceful integration.  RAEM 
was reinstalled in the late 1970s. In the 1980s the state laid an emphasis more on co-existence of 
ethnic groups, but shifted increasingly to economic and cultural integration after the mid 1990s.   
 
Main Ethnic Political Policies 
 
China’s ethnic policies are spelled out chiefly in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.  First 
promulgated in 1984, it was amended in 2001.  It allows the setting up of ethnic autonomous 
areas (Article 12) of regions (provinces), prefectures and counties if one or more minorities live 
there in concentrated communities.   
 
By the end of 2000 the PRC had 154 ethnic autonomous localities, including five provincial-level 
autonomous regions (zizhiqu) (see Table 1), 30 autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou), and 119 
autonomous counties or leagues (zizhixian or zizhiqi).  In addition, there were 1256 ethnic 
townships （minzu xiang民族乡）.  Forty-four of the 55 ethnic minorities have set up their own 
autonomous areas.  Three quarters of ethnic minorities reside in autonomous areas which 
accounted for 64% of the national territory. 2   
 
According to Li Weihan, the architect of RAEM, the core of regional ethnic autonomy is 
administrative autonomy. 3   According to the Law, in the ethnic autonomous areas, the 
administrative chief (including the chairman of an autonomous region, the prefect of an 
autonomous prefecture or the head of an autonomous county), as well as the chairman or vice 
chairman of the standing committee of the legislature (coined people’s congress) shall be a 
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3 Xu Xiaoping and Jin Xin, Zhongguo minzu wenti baogao (A Report on the Ethnic Issue in China).  Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2008, pp. 70-1. 
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citizen of the ethnic group exercising regional autonomy (Article 17).  As of 1998, the top 
legislative and administrative leaders of 154 autonomous regions and areas in the reform era 
were ethnic minorities.4   
 
The state also allows ethnic minorities to have a higher representation in legislature and at 
various levels of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference than their shares in 
population. Compared to the 1954-59 period, an era of moderate ethnic policies, the share of 
ethnic minorities as national legislators initially increased from a low 9.4% in 1975, to around 14.8% 
in 1988 and 1993.  It was a respectable 13.8% in 2003 and 2008 (Table 2).  This is much higher 
than the 8.4% share of ethnic minorities in the population. 
 
The Party devotes considerable resources to training and grooming cadres of ethnic minorities.  
According to official statistics, in 1998, there were 2.7 million cadres of ethnic minorities, 
accounting for 6.9% of cadres nationwide, 54 times that in the early years of the PRC.  The share 
of ethnic minorities in the cadre corps was 73.9% in Tibet, 47% in Xinjiang, 34% in Guangxi, 23.4% 
in Inner Mongolia and 17.5% in Ningxia.5  In 2002 there were 4.1 million ethnic CCP members, 
equivalent to 6.2% of the total 66.4 membership, a noticeable increase from 2.8 million or 5.7% in 
1990.6   
 
The Law leaves it to the ethnic autonomous regions to decide on whether to implement 
regulations and policies from higher authorities.  The decision, however, is subject to the approval 
of the higher authorities who are given 60 days to respond (Article 20).  However, in practice 
there are indications that the higher authority sometimes sits on the request without giving a 
timely reply. 
 
The Law also empowered autonomous areas with the right to enact self-governing regulations 
and separate regulations tailored to local and ethnic conditions. These regulations, again, need to 
be submitted to the legislature of the next higher level for approval (Article 19).  Autonomous 
areas can also organize local public security forces for local need and with national approval (Art. 
24). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Wang and Chen, Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan, p. 44. 
5 Wang and Chen, Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan, p. 44. 
6 See sources of Table 2.  Colin Mackerras. “Ethnic Minorities”, in Czeslaw Tubilewicz. ed. Critical Issues in 
Contemporary China. New York:  Routledge, 2006, p. 177. 
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Social and Economic Privileges for Minorities 
 
Other than limited regional autonomy, the RAEM also entails affirmative action for the ethnic 
minorities, as well as fiscal benefits and economic and cultural support from the state for ethnic 
areas.   First of all, ethnic minorities in China enjoy favorable social treatments comparable to 
affirmative actions enjoyed by minorities in the U.S.  They are under lax restrictions in birth 
control and are subject to relaxed requirements in admission into schools, colleges and 
universities and employment in state or public institutions.  They even enjoy the state’s favorable 
treatment in judicial and civil disputes involving the Han. In addition, ethnic minorities have 
cultural privileges of using ethnic minority’s languages at schools and receiving support from the 
state in preserving ethnic culture and heritages.  
 
In addition, ethnic areas receive relatively generous fiscal subsidies from the central government, 
and economic aids from developed coastal provinces for the autonomous areas.   In the 1990s 
autonomous areas suffered from limited fiscal support from the state.  The state focused on 
coastal development and drastically scaled down its subsidies and financial support for the ethnic 
autonomous regions.  This led to growing fiscal deficits and declining national economic standing 
of these areas.  In order to address growing discontents from cadres and population from these 
regions (including unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the 1990s), Beijing introduced the western 
developmental program in 2000.  In 2005 Beijing launched a social-economic developmental 
program in the ethnic areas coined “flourishing borders and prosperous people”.  Since the mid 
1990s economic growth in five ethnic provinces has accelerated.   
 
China as a “Unitary Multiethnic State” 
 
There are limits to rights bestowed on China’s ethnic minorities.  First of all, according to the Law, 
the PRC is a “unitary multiethnic state”, whereby separation of any territorial units from the nation 
is strictly prohibited, ethnic unity preserved, and separatist activities severely punished.   
 
Second, as the Chinese Communist Party is the ruling party, the Party is the supreme power 
holder at all levels and in all localities in China.  Ethnic autonomous regions are no exception.  
The post of administrative chief (governors, mayors, magistrates, etc.) of the EAAs that is held by 
ethnic minorities is the No. 2 office.  In most EAAs the Party Secretary, the No. 1 power holder, is 
usually a Han.  This led to some to view regional autonomy as a mere political facade to disguise 
the Han’s dominance.   
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Third, the CCP devotes considerable resources to training cadre corps of ethnic minorities. They 
are taught to dutifully implement the Party’s line and refrain from making ostensible demands for 
their ethnic groups, especially political ones.  Fourth, the actual utilization of the legal 
prerogatives of not implementing policies from above in ethnic areas is quite rare. 
 
Achievements of China’s Ethnic Policies 
 
In terms of economic development, Beijing has developed ethnic areas at a faster rate than the 
nation as a whole in the last 12 years.  By doing so, Beijing has narrowed the economic gaps 
between the ethnic areas and the nation.  This does help to take out the steam from ethnic 
discontent.  Ethnic autonomous regions grew by 1.5% a year, much more rapid than the nation as 
a whole from 1996-2006 and by 2.4% a year from 2001-2006 (Table 3).    
 
Moreover, the central and local governments have provided comparable medical services to 
ethnic areas.  From 1995 to 2006 there were 2.3 to 2.4 hospital beds per 1,000 residents in the 
ethnic regions, almost the same as the range of 2.3-2.5 for the nation (Table 4). 
 
Similar changes have taken place in Southern Xinjiang.  In the past rural Uighurs there drank dirty 
untreated water from small ponds right outside their run-down houses.  In the recent years, many 
villagers are provided with sanitary water. Villagers there no longer need to worry about disease 
from unclean water.  As a result, some Uighurs even cooperated with the local authority in 
reporting and arresting violent Uighur extremists in recent years.  
 
Moreover, in the course of China’s rapid economic development, many ethnic groups in China 
want to ride on the nation’s rapid economic progress and prosperity.  Mastering the Chinese 
language seems to be the most viable option.  Many ethnic parents want their children to speak 
Mandarin so as to fare well in the job market. This helps in the economic and cultural integration 
of China. 
 
Internationally, two factors have aided Beijing.  First, the September 11 attacks and the West’s 
anti-terror war have undermined the legitimacy of radical and violent movements for 
independence in Tibet and Xinjiang around the world.  Second, a rising China has given ethnic 
groups the incentive to identify themselves with the Chinese nation. 
 
Finally, despite the real limits of regional ethnic autonomy, the institution apparently has been 
acceptable to most of the 55 ethnic minorities.  This is vividly reflected in the fact that only liberal 
and radical Tibetans and Uighurs demand autonomy and even independence far beyond the 
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current RAEM allows for; all the other ethnic groups have been more or less quiterelatively silent, 
despite sporadic unrest in Inner Mongolia in the early reform years. 
 
Internal and External Challenges for China’s Ethnic Policies  
 
China’s ethnic policies face practical challenges in economic and social terms.  Despite rapid 
growth, the gap in GDP per capita between ethnic regions and the nation as a whole is enlarging, 
even though the ratio to GDP per capita is declining.  The gap in GDP per capita between ethnic 
regions and the nation steadily increased from 1773 yuan in 1995 to 5488 yuan in 2006 while the 
ratio of the gap to ethnic GDP per capita has been declining, from the peak of 76% in 2000 down 
to 52% in 2006 (Table 3).   
 
Adult literacy is also comparatively lower in ethnic areas which also register serious fiscal deficit.  
According to the last major national census in 2000, adult literacy in ethnic areas was 86.9%, 5.8% 
lower than the national rate of 92.7% (Table 4).  The ratio of deficit to local revenue in these 
areas grew from 1.4:1 in 1995, to 1.47:1 in 2000, and peaked at 1.97:1 in 2005.  It decreased 
slightly to 1.92:1 in 2006.  In comparison, the ratio in the nation as a whole in these years ranged 
mostly from 1.21:1 to 1.29:1.  It peaked at 1.48:1 in 2000 (Table 4).  the weak capacity for local 
revenue generation has hindered the provision of public services in ethnic areas, reflected in 
lower local fiscal expenditure per capita than nationwide (Table 4). 
 
In Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic separatism has been most prominent and in some cases, 
violent, there seems to be an uneven distribution of economic benefits.  The Han and the Hui 
outperform other ethnicities in the western region, where ethnic minorities are concentrated.  This 
is due to their entrepreneurial spirit and hard work, their possession of capital, skills, and social 
and even political networks, and proficiency in Mandarin.   
 
The most serious challenge to China’s ethnic policies comes from Tibetans and Uighurs.  In 
general, language, religion, geopolitics, and the late integration with China all play a part in their 
political separatist tendency.  Most of the 55 ethnic minorities are not proficieint in their own 
ethnic language. Even the most populous ethnic groups, such as the Zhuang, Manchus, the Hui, 
and Mongolians, use Mandarin.  Most of them have been integrated into China for centuries, and 
are therefore highly sinicized.   
 
Though more Tibetans and Uighurs can speak Mandarin, they still maintain the use of their own 
language, their ethnic cultural identity as well as their strong religious belief.  Both provinces were 
integrated into China at a rather late point in history.  They became a standard sub-national unit 
 7 
of China during the Qing Dynasty.  Both provinces are also far away from the power center of 
Beijing.  It takes about five hours of flight from Beijing to reach Lhasa and 4 hours to reach 
Urumqi.     
 
Finally, both provinces are backed by external forces and influences.  The Dalai Lama in exile 
becomes the spiritual and appealing leader for the Tibetan movement while the Uighurs are 
inspired by radical Islam, Turkic nationalism , the independence of the former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia, and the once-successful Uighur attempt at setting up their own republic in the early 
20th century. 
 
The crackdown on demonstrators has been heavily criticized by the West. Beijing has much to do 
to improve its public image.  It should be more open and less sensitive on its ethnic issues.  Its 
ban on foreign journalists’ coverage of ethnic violence, imposed again in the wake of the Tibetan 
riots and Uighur attacks, only deepens Western bias against Beijing.   
 
The West’s criticisms of Beijing do not end here.  If Beijing upholds co-existence of ethnic groups, 
the West may criticize it for ignoring the economic hardship of the ethnic minorities and for only 
helping out the Han.  However, if Beijing accelerates economic integration, it will be accused of 
“destroying the ethnic culture” and “colonizing the periphery inhabited by the ethnic minorities.”  
Furthermore, the West tends to embrace self-rule or self-determination in areas embroiled in 
ethnic conflict.  This inevitably sets itself on the collision course with Beijing which tolerates no 
major challenges to its unitary and centralized political control. 
 
Recent riots in Tibet and terror attacks in Xinjiang apparently aimed to draw international attention, 
especially from the West, at a time China was about to host the Olympic Games.   Disgruntlement 
and resentment of the more competitive Han and Hui by unemployed and underperforming 
Tibetans and Uighurs might have played a role in the recent riots in Tibet and terror attacks in 
southern Xinjiang.  Some of the attacks (such as arson in Tibetan areas and blasts in Kuqa) 
targeted shops and stores owned by the Han (and in the case of Tibetan riots, also the Hui). 
 
The riots are also apparently targeted at Beijing’s ethnic policies.  In 1992 the Dalai Lama 
withdrew his previous demands for autonomy of Tibet (and even a greater Tibet) like that enjoyed 
by Hong Kong. Instead, he demanded for “meaningful autonomy”.  Recently, he reaffirmed his 
position, declared his concern for “religious harmony”, “human values” and “the well-being of the 
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Tibetan people”.  He referred to the elections of the Tibetan representatives and wanted the 
Tibetan issue to be resolved through “international norms”.7   
 
Radical Uighurs’ demands usually include independence of Xinjiang.  Many Uighurs see Xinjiang 
as their own land and resent the inflow of ethnicities that do not live there in the past, especially a 
large number of Han people.  All these demands go far beyond Beijing’s principle of limited 
autonomy, with some falling under Beijing’s category of “splitting up the motherland”, a serious 
political crime. 
 
In the reform era, top Chinese leaders have attached great significance to regional autonomy for 
the minorities.  In 1987 Deng once remarked that Mao was right in not copying Soviet federalism 
of allowing for secession of provinces, thus maintaining China‘s unity.  His successor, the then 
State President Jiang Zemin coined regional ethnic autonomy as one of the three fundamental 
political institutions of the state.8  In 2003,  Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, proclaimed the “three 
insists” (三个坚持)—adherence to socialism, the CCP leadership and RAEM.   This stance was 
reaffirmed in 2006 by the Politburo of the CCP.9   
 
In July 2008, in its dialogue with envoys of the Dalai Lama, Beijing reaffirmed the “three insists” 
principles in its Tibet policy in.  As RAEM will remain a pillar for China’s ethnic policies in the 
foreseeable future, it is unlikely that Beijing will allow Tibet and Xinjiang to have political and 
administrative autonomy like Hong Kong, even less for independence.  These political scenarios 
simply do not fit into Beijing’s de facto limited regional ethnic autonomy framework offered to 53 
other ethnicities, in addition to Tibetans and Uighurs. 
 
                                                
7 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHDL), “His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibet Issue,” July 17, 
2008, OHDL Press Release. 
8 Wang and Chen, Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan, pp. 36-7. 
9 “Central Government’s Policy toward the Dalai Lama Changes from ‘Two Supports’ to ‘Three Insistences’” 
(中央政府对十四世达赖政策 从"赞成两条"到"三个坚持"), posted at http://cn.chinagate.com.cn/infocus/2008-
05/20/content_15352505.htm on May 20, 2008, accessed 
July 2, 2008.  
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Table 1. China’s Five Provincial-level Ethnic Autonomous Regions  
 
Name Set-up  
Date 
Capital Area 
 (1000  
square
 km) 
Population  
(millions) 
Population of
 Ethnic  
Minorities  
(millions) 
Percentage  
of Ethnic  
Minorities 
(%) 
Inner Mongolia  
Autonomous Region 
May 1,  
1947 
Hohhot 1,183 23.9 5.2 21.6 
Xinjiang Uyghur  
Autonomous Region 
October 
1, 1955 
Urumqi 1,650 20.1 12.1 60.4 
Guangxi Zhuang  
Autonomous Region 
March 1
5, 1958 
Nanning 236 49.25 19.0 38.54 
Ningxia Hui  
Autonomous Region 
October  
25, 1958 
Yinchuan 66.4 5.96 2.1 35.98 
Tibet Autonomous  
Region 
Septemb
er 1, 196
5 
Lhasa 1,228 2.76 2.6 93.48 
 
Sources: Wang and Chen, Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan, p. 227; China Statistical Yearbook 
2006, Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2006, p. 45. 
 
 
Table 2. Number of Ethnic Minorities in the National People’s Congress 
 
NPC Year Total  
Deputies  
Deputies of  
Ethnic Minorities 
Percentage  
of the Total  
Number of Minorities  
Represented 
First 1954 1266 178 14.5 30 
Third 1964 3040 372 12.2 53 
Fourth 1975 2885 270 9.4 54 
Fifth 1978 3497 381 10.9 54 
Sixth 1983 2978 405 13.6 55 
Eight 1993 2977 493 14.8 55 
Tenth 2003 2985 415 13.9 55 
Eleventh 2008 2987 411 13.8 55 
 
Sources: Wang, Xinshiqi minzu zhengce de lilun yu shijian, p. 68; “Shijie quanguo renda daibiao 
mingdan gongbu” (The Name List of the Deputies of the Tenth National People’s Congress Is 
Publicized), posted at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-03/02/content_752650.htm; “Shiyijie 
quanguo renda 2987ming daibiao zige queren quanbu youxiao” (Qualifications of 2987 Deputies 
of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Have All Been Confirmed), posted at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-02-28/214015040922.shtml, accessed on April 14, 2008. 
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Table 3. Economic Indicators of Ethnic Areas Compared to Those of the Nation 
 
 Ethnic Minority Autonomous  Regions National 
   1996-  2006 
2001-  
06  
1979
-200
6 
1996-  
2006 
2001- 
06 
GDP Annual Growth (%)   10.7 12.2  9.7 9.2 9.8 
Ethnic Regions’ Edge  
over the Nation in  
Growth (%) 
  1.5 2.4     
 1995 2000 2005 2006 1995 2000 2005 2006 
GDP Per Capita (Yuan) 3,055 4,451 8,991 10,554 4,828 7,828 14,062 16,042 
Gap Between Ethnic  
Regions and the Nation  
(Yuan) 
-1,773
  
  -3,377
  
  -5,071
  
-5,488 
    
Gap/GDP Per Capita of  
Ethnic Regions  -58% -76% -56% -52%     
 
Sources: The author’s compilation and computation using data from China Statistical Yearbook 
2007, 26-33; 46-49; 60; China Statistical Yearbook 2002, 22-29. 
 
 
Table 4. Fiscal and Social Indicators of Ethnic Areas Compared to Those of the Nation 
 
 Ethnic Minority Autonomous  Regions National 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Hospital Beds Per 1000  
Residents  2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 
Adult Literacy (%)  86.9     92.7   
Local Government Revenue Per  
Capita (Yuan) 155 283 588 724 246 505 1155 1392 
Local Government Expenditure  
Per Capita (Yuan) 371 697 1746 2112 563 1253 2595 3075 
Fiscal Deficits/ Fiscal Revenue  
(local) -1.40 -1.47 -1.97 -1.92 -1.29 -1.48 -1.25 -1.21 
 
Sources: The author’s compilation and computation using data from China Statistical Yearbook 
2007, 26-33; 46-49; China Statistical Yearbook 2002, 22-29; Zhongguo Minzu Tongji Nianjian 
2007 (China's Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2007), Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2008, 644. 
  
 
